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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 97-5004 
 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
DOMINICK D'ANDREA, INC., 
 
       Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff 
 
v. 
 
ALMONESSON ASSOCIATES; TARQUINI ORGANIZATION; 
THE DOUGLAS COMPANY; JOHN DOE 1-10, being a 
fictitious person, corporation or entity, 
 
       Third-Party Defendants 
 
Dominick D'Andrea, Inc., 
 
       Appellant 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
D.C. No.: 93-cv-1765 
 
Argued: January 22, 1998 
 
Before: SLOVITER, LEWIS, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed July 10, 1998) 
 
       A. Richard Bailey (Argued) 
       Cozen & O'Connor 
       1900 Market Street 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
       Counsel for Appellee 
 
 
  
       Audrey J. Copeland (Argued) 
       Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, 
        Coleman & Goggin 
       1845 Walnut Street 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
       Counsel for Appellant 
 
OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, the appellant primarily presents a 
troublesome challenge to the authority of a magistrate 
judge to impose a substantial monetary sanction as a 
condition of allowing a pre-trial amendment to its answer. 
After the magistrate judge issued a final pre-trial order 
setting the end of discovery and scheduling trial, and 
almost two years after the appellant filed its original 
answer, counsel for the appellant moved for leave to amend 
the answer to assert a controlling affirmative defense. 
During discovery, previous counsel for the appellant had 
delayed the litigation several times because of his severe 
illness. Frustrated with the delays, the magistrate judge 
ultimately permitted the appellant to amend its answer and 
file a motion for summary judgment, but not before 
imposing the condition that the appellant pay the opposing 
party's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for the 
additional discovery necessitated by the amendment. Later, 
the district court granted summary judgment based on the 
affirmative defense. 
 
The appellant did not object to the condition at the time 
it was imposed, paid the amount of the sanction without 
objection, and did not appeal to the district court within 10 
days as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) 
and a local district court rule. We conclude that, unless 
exceptional circumstances exist, a party may not obtain 
relief in this court without making an objection and seeking 
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review of the magistrate judge's order in the district court. 
Because we find no exceptional circumstances, we affirm.* 
 
I. 
 
The dispute in this case had its genesis in two severe 
windstorms that inflicted heavy damage on the foundation 
walls of a nascent shopping center. Almonesson Associates, 
L.P. ("Almonesson"), is the owner and developer of the 
shopping center, called The Court at Deptford in Deptford, 
New Jersey. Almonesson retained the Douglas Company 
("Douglas") to serve as general contractor for the 
construction. Almonesson and Douglas memorialized their 
relationship by the "Standard Form of Agreement Between 
Owner and Contractor" printed by the American Institute of 
Architects ("AIA"). The front page of the agreement "adopted 
... by reference" AIA Document A201, the "General 
Conditions of the Contract for Construction." 
 
In September 1989, Douglas hired Dominic D'Andrea, 
Inc. ("D'Andrea"), as a subcontractor to perform the 
masonry work on the shopping center. The plaintiff, 
Continental Casualty Company ("Continental"), insured 
Almonesson against loss of and damage to Almonesson's 
property. D'Andrea, the defendant herein, performed the 
masonry work at the construction site between September 
and November of 1989. D'Andrea was not a party to the 
underlying construction contract. On November 16 and 21, 
1989, severe winds blew down these exterior walls. 
Pursuant to its obligation under the insurance policy, 
Continental paid Almonesson $1.3 million for the damage 
to the walls. 
 
On April 28, 1993, Continental filed this diversity action 
as subrogee of its insured, Almonesson, against D'Andrea 
in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey. In its complaint, Continental alleged that 
D'Andrea's faulty construction of the exterior walls resulted 
in damages of $1.3 million.1 D'Andrea then filed a third- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Although Judge Lewis heard argument in this case, he has been 
unable, however, to clear this written opinion because of illness. 
 
1. Specifically, Continental alleged that D'Andrea's failure to adhere to 
the requirements of the architect and general contractor, basic industry 
and engineering practices, and Deptford's building code resulted in the 
destruction of the walls. 
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party complaint against Douglas, Almonesson, and the 
Tarquini Organization, the architect for the project.2 The 
case was assigned to a United States magistrate judge for 
pretrial and discovery matters. The parties conducted 
discovery and during this period an apparently severe 
illness and an adverse reaction to medication resulted in 
D'Andrea's counsel's failure to meet discovery deadlines. As 
an accommodation to counsel, the magistrate judge 
extended previously established discovery and other 
deadlines on numerous occasions. Ultimately, the 
magistrate judge entered five separate scheduling orders 
and a final pre-trial order. He scheduled trial for June 12, 
1995. In his final pre-trial order, dated February 10, 1995, 
the magistrate judge warned that "there will be no further 
extensions of time and no reopening of discovery." 
(Emphasis in original). 
 
Also in this order, the magistrate judge permitted 
D'Andrea to depose Gene Carey, Nicholas S. Colanzi, and 
Joseph Sobel, expert witnesses retained by Continental. 
Apparently as a sanction for violating discovery deadlines, 
the judge ordered D'Andrea to pay the three experts' 
reasonable expert witness fees and the reasonable 
attorneys' fees of counsel for Continental incurred during 
the depositions of Colanzi and Sobel. The order made no 
provision for D'Andrea to file a motion for summary 
judgment, but permitted Douglas to file one no later than 
February 17, 1995. 
 
In March 1995, another attorney, Craig Hudson, entered 
an appearance on behalf of D'Andrea as co-counsel. On 
March 10, 1995, Hudson moved for leave to amend 
D'Andrea's answer to assert a critical and controlling 
affirmative defense based on a provision in the addendum 
to the AIA construction contract entered into by 
Almonesson and Douglas. This provision provided that: 
"[t]he Owner and Contractor waive all rights against (1) 
each other and any of the their subcontractors ... for 
damages caused by fire or other perils to the extent covered 
by property insurance." AIA Document A201, Article 11.3.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. D'Andrea voluntarily dismissed Tarquini from the lawsuit on March 
31, 1994. 
 
                                4 
  
(1987 ed.). The effect of this addendum was to deny 
Continental any subrogation rights against D'Andrea. 
Hudson gave two explanations for raising this defense at 
this late stage -- almost two years after D'Andreafiled its 
original answer. He attributed the failure to raise the 
defense to the illness of previous counsel and to the failure 
of plaintiff 's counsel to produce the addendum in discovery 
or otherwise point out the waiver of subrogation. In his 
motion, Hudson stated: "If Continental does believe that 
additional discovery is needed, the court can certainly 
[make] such arrangements." Hudson also requested 
permission to file a motion for summary judgment based on 
the addendum. 
 
At oral argument before the magistrate judge on 
Hudson's motion and request, counsel for Continental 
indicated that if the amendment were permitted, he would 
need to take additional discovery to counter D'Andrea's 
affirmative defense. The magistrate judge evinced great 
displeasure with both the tardiness of Hudson's motion and 
the resulting additional discovery. The judge commented 
that he had given previous counsel every accommodation 
by changing deadlines in order to compensate for time lost 
as a result of counsel's illness and that counsel for both 
parties had equal access to the addendum because it was 
explicitly referred to in the Almonesson-Douglas contract. 
Hudson agreed that at least part of the blame rested either 
with previous counsel or his client: "[W]e should have found 
it, and we didn't find it. It was a foul up on this end." The 
magistrate judge refused to allow D'Andrea to amend its 
answer or move for summary judgment until it agreed to 
pay opposing counsel's fees and costs incurred in opposing 
D'Andrea's motions and in conducting the additional 
discovery. The judge issued a written order setting forth the 
condition for the amendment on February 5, 1996. 
 
There is no dispute that D'Andrea did not object to the 
condition imposed by the magistrate judge to the 
amendment of its answer. Indeed, at the hearing, the 
following exchange took place between the magistrate judge 
and Hudson: 
 
       COURT:  From this point forward, all of Mr. Bailey's 
       [counsel for Continental] fees, reasonable 
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       legal fees, as a condition of permitting this 
       amendment, will be paid for by ... 
       Commercial Union [D'Andrea's insurer]. 
       This is an explicit condition, and is the 
       only condition under which I will permit 
       the amendment of these affirmative 
       defenses and summary judgment motion. 
       ... You will pay as an explicit condition of 
       permitting this, time for his legal fees in 
       regard to opposing your motion. You're not 
       going to pay for his cost at trial; only those 
       fees related to the amendments. Is that 
       clear? 
 
       HUDSON: So I can make sure I tell Commercial 
       Union. Including opposing my motion for 
       summary judgment? 
 
       COURT:  Absolutely. 
 
       HUDSON: Okay. 
 
Later in the hearing, the magistrate judge reiterated this 
condition and asked: "Is this absolutely clear? Do you have 
any questions?" Hudson responded, "No." One last time, 
the court asked Hudson: "No question about what your 
obligation is with regard to Mr. Bailey?" Hudson responded: 
"No, I think you've made it pretty clear, Your Honor." After 
the court issued its written order setting forth the 
condition, D'Andrea did not file an appeal with the district 
court. During the next several months, the parties engaged 
in the additional discovery Continental claimed was 
necessitated by the amendment to D'Andrea's answer. 
 
Following this discovery, by letter dated May 24, 1996, 
Continental's counsel provided Hudson with an itemized list 
of its fees and expenses which totaled approximately 
$38,000. Hudson responded, also by letter, that the 
attorneys' fees were unreasonable, excessive, and had 
included fees not encompassed by the magistrate judge's 
February 10, 1995 and February 5, 1996 orders. At this 
time, Hudson did not object to the imposition of fees and 
costs or claim that the magistrate judge's orders were 
erroneous. In two letters, one dated June 27, 1996 to 
counsel for Continental, and one dated August 8, 1996 to 
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the magistrate judge, Hudson never objected to the 
imposition of the attorneys' fees and costs. Instead, his 
letter focused almost entirely on his objection to the 
amount of the fees requested by Continental. On August 
27, 1996, by letter to counsel, the magistrate judge ruled 
that D'Andrea must pay all of the fees and expenses sought 
by Continental. D'Andrea did not appeal the magistrate 
judge's letter ruling to the district court. On September 17, 
1996, Commercial Union Insurance Company, D'Andrea's 
insurer, paid the full amount of the fees requested by 
Continental. 
 
D'Andrea duly filed its motion for summary judgment 
predicated on the addendum, which the district court 
granted. In its order, apparently unaware that D'Andrea 
had already done so, the district court directed D'Andrea to 
"comply with the February 5, 1996 order of ... [the 
magistrate judge] regarding the fees and expenses incurred 
by plaintiff in opposing the present summary judgment 
motion." On January 2, 1997, D'Andrea filed a notice of 
appeal.3 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, D'Andrea contends that the magistrate judge's 
sanctions far exceeded the scope of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 16 pertaining to scheduling and management of 
pretrial conferences. D'Andrea asserts that "[n]o rule, 
`inherent power,' statute or law supports the 
disproportionate and vastly excessive fees and cost 
sanctions under the circumstances in this case. The 
egregiously unjust sanction far outweighed any discretion 
that a magistrate or district court might have to sanction a 
party for perceived misconduct during pre-trial 
proceedings." Furthermore, D'Andrea argues that sanctions 
were wrongly directed to the client rather than its counsel, 
that the imposition of the sanctions ignored the plaintiff's 
conduct in the first instance in filing a "spurious lawsuit" 
when it had no claim against the defendant. Had the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1332(a)(1). This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
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plaintiff produced the entire written contact, or had it 
indicated in discovery that portions of the contract were 
incomplete and referred to the addendum, defendant 
asserts this case would have summarily ended. Instead, the 
defendant argues, that "unjust punishment has been 
imposed upon D'Andrea for delay caused by Continental's 
unintentional obfuscation (or deliberate concealment) of the 
waiver of subrogation." 
 
Before we address D'Andrea's strenuous arguments, a 
serious threshold question that we must confront is 
whether or not they may be raised on appeal. Continental 
argues that D'Andrea may not obtain review in this court 
because it failed to object to the magistrate judge's orders 
and, with respect to the second order, it agreed to the 
imposition of the fees and costs in exchange for permission 
to amend its answer and assert the affirmative defense of 
the waiver of subrogation. Continental further contends 
that review in this Court is not permitted because D'Andrea 
failed to appeal the orders to the district court as required 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a)4  and District of New 
Jersey Local Rule of Civil Procedure 40D(4)(a).5 
 
D'Andrea replies that review is proper in this court 
because, although it did not object to the magistrate judge's 
orders, an objection was unnecessary because all the 
parties knew that D'Andrea was "unhappy" with the orders. 
D'Andrea also urges that its failure to appeal the second 
order is not fatal because the district court "reviewed" it 
sua sponte in its order granting summary judgment, 
thereby satisfying Rule 72(a)'s requirement of district court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Rule 72(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: 
 
       Within 10 days after being served with a copy of the magistrate 
       judge's order, a party may serve and file objections to the order; 
a 
       party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in the magistrate 
       judge's order to which objection was not timely made. 
 
5. District of New Jersey Local Rule of Civil Procedure 40D(4)(a) 
provides, 
in pertinent part, that: 
 
       Any party may appeal from a Magistrate's determination of a non- 
       dispositive matter within 10 days after a party has been served 
with 
       a copy of the Magistrate's order, unless a motion for reargument of 
       the matter has been timely filed and served. 
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review. D'Andrea offers no excuse for failing to object to or 
appeal the first order. 
 
The district court referred this case to the magistrate 
judge pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Act (the "Act"), 
which permits United States District Judges to assign 
specified matters to magistrate judges. See 28 U.S.C. 
SS 631-39. There are two types of assignments under the 
Act. First, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A),6 with 
specifically noted exceptions, a magistrate judge may hear 
and decide pretrial matters which do not ultimately dispose 
of the litigation. Id. The magistrate judge's order is 
dispositive as to the discrete matter referred to him or her 
unless the district court takes action to overrule it. United 
Steelworkers of America v. New Jersey Zinc Co., Inc., 828 
F.2d 1001, 1005 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing legislative history). In 
this type of referral, pursuant to Rule 72(a) and Local Rule 
40D(4)(a), a party aggrieved by the magistrate judge's order 
may seek review of it by appealing to the district court 
within 10 days after being served with a copy of the order. 
Upon appeal, the district court "may reconsider any pretrial 
matter ... where it has been shown that the magistrate's 
order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. 
S 636(b)(1)(A). 
 
Second, pursuant to S 636(b)(1)(B),7  the district court may 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. That section provides: 
 
       (b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary--(A) a 
       judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial 
       matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive 
       relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, ... to 
       dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for 
       failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to 
       involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may 
reconsider 
       any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A) where it has been 
       shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary 
to 
       law. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A). 
 
7. That section provides: 
 
       (b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary--(B) a 
       judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, 
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designate a magistrate judge to hold a hearing, receive 
evidence and hear argument, make proposed findings of 
fact, and recommend a disposition. Once the magistrate 
judge's report and recommendation is filed, parties have 10 
days to object to it. 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(C). The district 
court must then review de novo the parts of the magistrate 
judge's report and recommendation to which a party 
objects. Id. The magistrate judge's report and 
recommendation does not have the force of law, it being 
merely a recommendation, unless and until the district 
court enters an order accepting or rejecting it. See New 
Jersey Zinc, 828 F.2d at 1005. 
 
There is an important distinction between the two types 
of referrals under the Act. In a subsection (A) referral, the 
magistrate judge's order has the force of law unless 
appealed. It is final in the sense that it may be appealed. In 
contrast, in a subsection (B) referral, the magistrate judge's 
recommendation only becomes effective when the district 
court accepts it. Hence, in a subsection (B) referral no 
appealable decision exists until the district court accepts 
the magistrate judge's recommendation. For this reason, we 
have held that a failure to object to a magistrate judge's 
report and recommendation does not foreclose appellate 
review in this Court. See Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 
874, 877 (3d Cir. 1987).8 
 
It is well settled that the intention of the Federal 
Magistrates Act is to "relieve courts of unnecessary work 
and to improve access to the courts." Niehaus v. Kansas 
Bar Ass'n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoted 
with approval in New Jersey Zinc, 828 F.2d at 1007). "The 
Act is designed to relieve the district courts of certain 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       including evidentiary, and to submit to a judge of the court 
       proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, 
       by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph 
(A). 
 
28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(B). 
 
8. In Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), the United States Supreme 
Court held that, pursuant to their supervisory power, the circuit courts 
may elect to permit or prohibit appellate review of unobjected to reports 
and recommendations. 
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subordinate duties that often distract the courts from more 
important matters." Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 
935 (1990) (citing legislative history); see also Government 
of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 
1989). The Act furthers this goal by permitting district 
judges to delegate certain matters to magistrate judges. 
Peretz, 501 U.S. at 935 n.9 (quoting legislative history). The 
time and resources of the district judges are conserved 
because, once the matter is assigned to a magistrate judge 
and he or she makes his or her decision or 
recommendation, the district judge need take no time 
reviewing the matter unless a party objects to the order. 
Hence, unobjected to orders and recommendations or parts 
thereof do not take up the district judge's time. If the 
district courts were required to review all of the magistrate 
judge's decisions and recommendations, even those to 
which there was no objection, the policy of the Act would be 
severely undermined. 
 
In the instant case, the court assigned this case 
pursuant to S 636(b)(1)(A). Hence, the magistrate judge was 
authorized to decide nondispositive pretrial mattersfinally. 
There is no dispute that the motion to amend filed by 
D'Andrea did not dispose of the lawsuit or a claim. See 
Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 346 (1st Cir. 1993) (motion 
to amend is nondispositive); see also Pyca Indus. v. 
Harrison County Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 
1421 (5th Cir. 1996) (motion to amend is nondispositive in 
context of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification). Review of this 
type of order is by appeal to the district court. Pursuant to 
Rule 72(a) and Local Rule 40D(4)(a), a party opposed to a 
magistrate judge's order must file objections within 10 days 
of service of the order. 
 
It is undisputed that D'Andrea did not object to or appeal 
to the district court either of the magistrate judge's orders. 
We first turn to the February 10, 1995 order of the 
magistrate judge ordering D'Andrea to pay certain counsel 
and expert witness fees. D'Andrea offers no excuse for its 
failures to object to or appeal this order. As a general rule, 
we do not consider on appeal issues that were not raised 
before the district court in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances. Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 
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107, 116 (3d Cir. 1992); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153- 
54 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. 
Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 1983)). D'Andrea points to 
no exceptional circumstances with respect to this order.9 
Hence, we decline to review it. 
 
With regard to the February 5, 1996 order, D'Andrea 
claims an objection or appeal was not necessary. D'Andrea 
asserts that the spirit of the objection and appeal 
requirements were met because the magistrate judge and 
Continental knew that D'Andrea was "unhappy" with the 
February 5, 1996 order. D'Andrea argues that the judge's 
and plaintiff 's knowledge of its unhappiness has the same 
effect as an explicit and contemporaneous objection. 
 
We disagree for two reasons. First, D'Andrea points to 
nothing in the record which establishes that it was actually 
"unhappy" with the magistrate judge's order. To the 
contrary, we conclude that D'Andrea did not object because 
it elected to accept, albeit reluctantly, the condition the 
magistrate judge placed on permitting the amendment. 
When questioned by the magistrate judge, Hudson never 
stated that he opposed the order or that he intended to 
appeal it. Instead, he repeatedly told the magistrate judge 
that he understood the order and that he intended to 
inform his client of it.10 In the exchange of letters between 
counsel and the magistrate judge, D'Andrea then forewent 
several additional opportunities to object by paying the fees, 
without objection. We note that Hudson was keenly aware 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We recognize that the plain language of Rule 72(a) seems to prohibit a 
party from "assign[ing] as error a defect in the magistrate judge's order 
to which objection was not timely made." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). This 
language, however, is not a bar to review by this Court when exceptional 
circumstances exist. See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153-54 n.2. We have 
construed virtually identical language in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
51 similarly. Although that rule prohibits review in this Court when a 
party does not object to the district court's failure to give a jury 
instruction, we have permitted plain-error review. See Fausher v. New 
Jersey Transit Rail Opers., 57 F.3d 1269, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
10. We also note that Hudson seemed to be prepared to accept at least 
some conditions on the amendment of his answer when he stated in his 
motion to amend: "If Continental does believe that additional discovery 
is needed, the court can certainly [make] such arrangements." 
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that the magistrate judge was frustrated by previous 
counsel for D'Andrea's repeatedly delaying the litigation by 
missing deadlines. It seems apparent that the real reason 
for Hudson's failure to object to the order was to avoid 
further upsetting the magistrate judge by again delaying 
the litigation with an objection and an appeal to the district 
court. Presumably, Hudson reasoned that, even with the 
imposition of the attorneys' fees and costs, it was strategic 
for his client to pay them under the circumstances; if he 
was not permitted to amend his answer, his client faced a 
potential judgment for as much as approximately $1.3 
million. 
 
Second, even if we conclude that D'Andrea was 
"unhappy" with the magistrate judge's February 5, 1996 
order and that this was evident from the record, the rules 
of civil procedure do not permit a party's emotional state of 
mind to substitute for an objection or appeal. Hudson had 
several opportunities to state his opposition to the order 
and elected not to do so.11 Allowing a party's evident 
"unhappiness" about an order to constitute an objection is 
antithetical to orderly litigation. Parties are often unhappy 
with orders but elect not to object to them for tactical or 
other reasons. Permitting a state of mind to substitute for 
an objection on the record would allow a party to sandbag 
the district court and the other parties by allowing or 
inviting the court to make an error and then springing the 
issue on the other party on appeal. See 9A Charles A. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. D'Andrea suggests that the magistrate judge's intimidating behavior 
made the "atmosphere" at the hearing unconducive to an explicit 
objection. D'Andrea points to the judge's refusal to accommodate 
Hudson's calendar in setting discovery deadlines and referring to the 
presence of a United States Marshal to stifle further argument. We have 
reviewed the record and note that, while somewhat angry and harsh, the 
magistrate judge's comments were the result of frustration from 
D'Andrea's previous counsel's repeatedly missing deadlines. Even 
accepting D'Andrea's characterization of the judge's comments, they did 
not excuse an explicit objection. The rules do not require a prolonged 
protest or that the attorney directly confront an angry judge. They 
require only a respectful and explicit objection. See Charles A. Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure S 2472, at 94 (1995). 
Regardless, the magistrate judge's captious behavior does not excuse 
failing to file an appeal with the district court. 
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Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 2472, at 93-95 (1995). 
 
Explicit opposition or an objection on the record to a 
proposed order permits the court to consider the position of 
the opposing party and modify, or even possibly abandon, 
the order in light of the arguments raised. See Fleck 981 
F.2d at 116; Wright & Miller, supra, S 2472, at 94-95; cf. 
Elder v. Holloway, 984 F.2d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 1993) (party 
finding fault with jury charge must make timely objection 
to give trial judge chance to correct error before 
deliberation); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 
(1985) (requirement of timely objection to magistrate's 
report furthers judicial economy and focuses court on heart 
of parties' dispute). When a party fails to object, a court is 
deprived of the opportunity to correct the alleged defect. In 
this case, the magistrate judge and the district court were 
denied the opportunity to correct possible errors in the 
order because D'Andrea never objected to any of record. 
 
D'Andrea next contends that its compliance with Rule 
72(a) was excused because the district court sua sponte 
"reviewed" the magistrate judge's second order when it 
entered summary judgment on December 2, 1996. There is 
no indication that the district court actually reviewed the 
magistrate judge's order; the district court merely 
ministerially ordered D'Andrea to comply with the 
magistrate's order and pay the amount imposed. 
Unbeknownst to the district court, D'Andrea had already 
paid the amount without objection approximately three 
months earlier, in September 1996. Indeed, there would be 
no reason for the district court to review the order given 
that no objection by either party had been made to it. 
 
The overwhelming weight of authority supports our 
decision. This Court has specifically held that a party 
failing to appeal to the district court a magistrate judge's 
order in a nondispositive matter may not raise an objection 
to it on appeal to a circuit court. See New Jersey Zinc, 828 
F.2d at 1008; accord Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153-54 n.2; Turner 
v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 341 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1990). In addition, other circuits considering the issue also 
have decided that a failure to appeal a magistrate judge's 
subsection (A) order waives the right to challenge it on 
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appeal. See, e.g., Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 
1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996); Illinois Conf. of Teamsters v. 
Gilbert Trucking, 71 F.3d 1361, 1367-68 n.5 (7th Cir. 1995); 
ICA Constr. Corp. v. Reich, 60 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 
1995); CNP-q-Conselho Nacional v. Inter-Trade, Inc., 50 F.3d 
56-57 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 
345-47 (1st Cir. 1993); Boren v. N.L. Indus., 889 F.2d 1463, 
1465 (5th Cir. 1989); Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Ass'n, 793 
F.2d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 
It may well be that plaintiff's counsel took advantage of 
the magistrate judge's frustration to charge D'Andrea with 
excessive attorneys' fees and costs. D'Andrea may also be 
correct that the sanction was somewhat unjust. 
Continental may also have filed a spurious lawsuit in light 
of the addendum to the underlying contract waiving 
subrogation rights and, presumably having calculated the 
policy premium on that basis, must have known at all 
times it had no claim against the defendant. Nonetheless, 
even if an objection before the magistrate would have been 
futile, D'Andrea still had its remedy in the district court in 
each instance. It deliberately, however, chose not to avail 
itself of that remedy. 
 
Permitting review when no exceptional circumstances 
exist would severely undermine the Act's aim to save the 
district courts' time and resources by improperly 
encouraging them to review even unobjected to orders. 
Thus, to uphold the policies of the Act, we must define 
exceptional circumstances narrowly. Only when the public 
interest requires review of the unraised issue, when 
manifest injustice would result from the failure to consider 
the new issue, or when the alleged error was fundamental 
and resulted in a highly prejudicial error do exceptional 
circumstances exist. 
 
In Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, the trial court entered a 
directed verdict to which counsel of the losing party did not 
object. On appeal, we reviewed the issue holding that it was 
waived and that there were no exceptional circumstances. 
The appellant contended that the failure of its counsel to 
object "was a fundamental and highly prejudicial error 
resulting in a miscarriage of justice." We rejected counsel's 
characterization of the error and refused to consider the 
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merits, stating: "Many errors by one's counsel prejudice a 
case; but few are said to be a miscarriage of justice. Mere 
prejudice is insufficient to retrieve an abandoned issue." Id. 
at 116. In the instant case, D'Andrea offers no explanation 
for its failure to raise an objection to the magistrate judge's 
orders or in appealing to the district court. Its counsel's 
conduct was not mere inadvertence or ineptness; counsel 
strategically made a calculated exercise of judgment that 
may have been ill-considered. See id. ("When a litigant 
takes an unequivocal position at trial, he cannot on appeal 
assume a contrary position simply because the decision in 
retrospect was a tactical mistake"). Thus, we do not find 
any exceptional circumstances. We are not aware of any 
obstacles to an appeal to the experienced and learned 
district judge and we see no public interest to be advanced 
by considering the amount of the attorneys' fees and costs 
here involved. See Altman v. Altman, 653 F.2d 755, 757-58 
(3d Cir. 1981); cf. Princeton Community Phone Booth, Inc. v. 
Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 708 n.1 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 
That counsel for D'Andrea appears to have elected to 
accept the magistrate judge's condition so that he could 
amend his answer is, by itself, sufficient to establish that 
no exceptional circumstances exist. Cf. United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (intentional 
relinquishment of known right extinguishes error related to 
that right). Even if that were not the case, no manifest 
injustice resulted from the magistrate judge's order. 
Although not free from cost to D'Andrea, the order 
permitted D'Andrea to raise a defense almost two years 
after it filed its original answer that it could have discovered 
much earlier in the litigation, led to the case being decided 
on the merits, and allowed D'Andrea to avoid a judgment 
against it for approximately $1.3 million. We do notfind 
any exceptional circumstances that would lead us to 
exercise our discretion to review the second order. 
 
Finally, we note that, while magistrate judges have ample 
discretion in controlling their dockets, see In re Fine Paper 
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) (district 
courts have wide discretion in controlling docket), and 
imposing sanctions to protect parties from abuse and 
unfair prejudice, cf. General Ins. Co. of America v. Eastern 
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Consol. Utils., Inc., 126 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 1997) (court 
of appeals reviews imposition of discovery sanctions for 
abuse of discretion), such discretion is not unlimited. 
Although we are mindful of the magistrate judge's 
frustration with the delays and his repeated 
accommodations of counsel for D'Andrea and his 
expression of such frustration, see Offut v. United States, 
348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954) ("a modicum of quick temper ... 
must be allowed even judges"), we question his imposition 
of such an onerous condition on an amendment to a 
pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (leave to amend pleadings 
shall be freely given "when justice so requires"). Requiring 
a party to pay $38,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to 
amend a pre-trial pleading is rarely justified when there is 
no evidence, or even a contention, that the sanctioned party 
acted in bad faith. However, because D'Andrea voluntarily 
decided to accept this condition without objection, we are 
constrained to deny review. 
 
III. 
 
In sum, we reaffirm our holding in New Jersey Zinc that 
a party that does not appeal a magistrate judge's 
nondispositive order to the district court waives its right to 
review the order in appellate court. Only when exceptional 
circumstances are present will we review such an order. 
Because we do not find exceptional circumstances in this 
case, the district court's February 10, 1995 and February 
5, 1996 orders will be affirmed. Each side to bear its own 
costs. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment to 
affirm. 
 
I concur in the judgment to affirm, but I write separately 
because my reasons differ to a significant extent from those 
given by my colleague, Judge Rosenn. Judge Rosenn's 
opinion sets forth, with his usual thoroughness and clarity, 
the procedural history, and I therefore will only augment 
his recitation with facts that I believe need emphasis. 
 
The complaint was filed by Continental Casualty 
Company against Dominick D'Andrea, Inc., a 
subcontractor, for subrogation for damages Continental 
had to pay to Almonesson Associates, L.P., the owner and 
developer of a shopping mall, when concrete walls that 
D'Andrea had constructed collapsed during a storm. 
Continental, who filed the complaint, had the obligation to 
prove that it was entitled to recover as subrogee. During 
discovery, Continental was requested by D'Andrea's prior 
attorney to produce the contract on which it based its suit, 
and in response it produced the contract between the 
Owner, Almonesson, and the general contractor, The 
Douglas Company. Although the first page of the contract 
incorporates by reference another document, "The 1987 
Edition of the AIA Document A201, General Conditions of 
the Contract for Construction," a standard form document 
that is apparently used often in construction contracts, 
that document, "the A201 document," was not produced by 
Continental in discovery. Nor did D'Andrea's counsel 
specifically request it. It was only after D'Andrea's new 
counsel realized he did not have the complete contract, a 
matter he learned from the motion for summary judgment 
filed by Douglas, a third-party defendant, did he obtain the 
A201 document. From that document, he discovered a 
provision in which Continental had waived its rights to 
subrogation of Almonesson's claim against D'Andrea. In 
other words, Continental had filed a lawsuit claiming 
subrogation when it had no legal right to do so, a 
conclusion confirmed by the district court when it granted 
summary judgment to D'Andrea and against Continental on 
that basis. 
 
Unfortunately for D'Andrea, the discovery of that 
addendum to the contract was not made until March 1995, 
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by which time the magistrate judge to whom the pretrial 
proceedings had been assigned had reached the limit of his 
patience, apparently because of delays caused by the 
illness of D'Andrea's former counsel. I note that no party 
disagrees that D'Andrea's former counsel was seriously ill, 
periodically hospitalized, and affected mentally by the 
illness. 
 
The motion of D'Andrea's new counsel to amend the 
answer to assert this dispositive defense of the waiver-of- 
subrogation clause was filed March 10, 1995, which was 
after the magistrate judge had filed the pretrial order 
(February 1995) expressly stating that there would be no 
further extensions. Nonetheless, D'Andrea moved to amend 
the Pretrial Order to add the affirmative defense and to 
move for summary judgment on that basis. Continental 
objected but sought additional discovery and an 
opportunity to oppose the summary judgment motion 
should the court grant D'Andrea's requests. The magistrate 
judge told the parties to address the motion to the district 
court, and that court then referred it back to him. 
 
The magistrate judge, apparently frustrated at this turn 
of events, granted the motion to amend the Pretrial Order 
based on the waiver-of-subrogation provision of the 
contract only on condition that all fees and expenses of 
Continental "that relate to the amendment" shall be borne 
by D'Andrea. Order dated Feb. 5, 1996. App. at 328. More 
explicitly, the magistrate judge stated: 
 
       all fees and expenses of [Continental] that relate to the 
       amendment shall be borne by [D'Andrea], including but 
       not limited to costs and fees for (i) briefing and 
       argument of the present motion, (ii) any further 
       discovery [Continental] requires, (iii) a scheduling 
       conference, (iv) all opposition to [Continental's] motion 
       for summary judgment; and [Continental] shall timely 
       submit certifications which reflect its expenses related 
       to the amendment. 
 
       . . . [I]f [D'Andrea] does not pay[Continental's] fees . . . 
       the affirmative defense which is the subject of this 
       order shall be stricken and the . . . motion for summary 
       judgment shall be dismissed. 
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App. at 328-29 (emphasis in original). 
 
It is true, as Judge Rosenn points out, that D'Andrea's 
counsel did not object at that time to the order conditioning 
the right to amend on payment of fees and expenses, nor 
did it appeal. But we cannot ignore evidence in the record 
that may help explain why D'Andrea's counsel may have 
thought that silence, rather than an appeal at that time, 
was his required course. The transcript of the hearing on 
the motion to amend before the magistrate judge on 
February 2, 1996 discloses that the hearing was scheduled 
only because the district court requested him to take a look 
at it. The magistrate judge also asked D'Andrea's original 
counsel to be present because some of the issues pertained 
to his conduct. 
 
The attitude of the magistrate judge toward the motion 
was evident at the start, when he stated, "This is a textbook 
example of abuse of the legal system." App. at 298. His 
hostility toward the arguments presented on behalf of 
D'Andrea is evident throughout, illustrated by his 
denomination of D'Andrea's counsel's argument, inter alia, 
as "hutzpa." App. at 304. I will not go through the colloquy 
verbatim, but Judge Rosenn also acknowledges the 
magistrate judge's "harsh comments" and "captious 
behavior." Ultimately the magistrate judge announced that 
he would permit the amendment because he believed that 
otherwise under the law of the Third Circuit, they would be 
"right back here in three years." App. at 321. He advised 
counsel that D'Andrea's insurance company would have to 
pay the legal fees related to the additional work needed to 
allow Continental to respond to the additional affirmative 
defenses. 
 
Toward the end of that colloquy, counsel for Continental 
asked the court, which had contemplated that the 
additional discovery should be completed in 20 days, to 
change that time to 60 days, which the court immediately 
agreed to do. The following then took place: 
 
        MR. HUDSON [counsel for D'Andrea]: I almost hate 
       to do this, but you're raising a calendar. I know the 
       second week in February I'm going to be at expert 
       depositions that -- 
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        THE COURT: You are going to have to get someone 
       else from your firm here. Now look it -- 
 
        MR. HUDSON: All right, I know. I thought I would 
       tell you -- 
 
        THE COURT: Don't push the envelope here, my 
       friend. I have this big huge marshall sitting back there. 
 
        MR. HUDSON: I just wanted to raise it. 
 
        THE COURT: Don't, don't, don't, don't. 
 
App. at 325 (emphasis added). 
 
I do not know for a fact what the magistrate intended by 
the reference to the "big huge marshall," but it is 
reasonable to believe that an attorney might take that as 
some kind of threat, whether intended benignly or not. 
When coupled with the fact that the fate of the amendment, 
with what counsel believed was a dispositive affirmative 
defense, and the fact, as Judge Rosenn acknowledges, that 
the client faced a potential judgment for $1.3 million, it is 
no wonder that counsel determined to proceed with the 
discovery under an order that he may have believed was 
unfair but which had not been reduced to any dollar 
amount. Nor do I believe it is reasonable to fault counsel for 
failing to appeal that non-dispositive order to the district 
court at that time. Counsel, having been subject to the 
magistrate judge's temper, may have reasonably determined 
not to risk his ire by an appeal. 
 
Thus, I respectfully disagree with Judge Rosenn that 
D'Andrea has no excuse for its failure to object to or appeal 
the order of February 5, 1996. Nor do I agree that Rule 
72(a) provides an unbreachable barrier under 
circumstances such as that here. 
 
In United Steelworkers of America v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 
828 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1987), we stated that although a 
party ordinarily waives its ability to challenge on appeal a 
magistrate's pretrial order by failing to file a timely 
objection, the failure to file a formal objection with the 
district court is not fatal to our review under"extraordinary 
circumstances." Id. at 1008 (citations omitted). Although 
Judge Rosenn acknowledges the "extraordinary 
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circumstances" exception, he believes that none have been 
shown here. I, on the contrary, believe that what appears to 
be an unexplained judicial threat, together with the 
possibility that a client will not be permitted to interpose a 
dispositive defense to a $1.3 million claim, is enough to 
constitute "extraordinary circumstances." 
 
We have construed language in Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 similar 
to that in Rule 72 to permit appellate review for plain error. 
See Fashauer v. New Jersey Transit, 57 F.3d 1269, 1289 
(3d Cir. 1995). We have defined plain errors as those errors 
that " `seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Osei-Afriyie v. Medical 
College of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 881 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 
(1936)). In Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506 
(3d Cir. 1997), we explained that a plain error challenge will 
succeed if there is an actual error, i.e., a deviation from or 
violation of a legal rule, the error is plain, i.e., clear and 
obvious under current law, and the error affects substantial 
rights. In other words, the error must be prejudicial and 
must have affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings. Id. at 520 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993)); see also Charles Alan Wright & 
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure 
S 5043 (1996). Although we exercise our power to reverse 
for plain error sparingly, Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. 
v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 89 F.3d 976, 994 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 117 S.Ct. 485 (1996), the circumstances of this 
case are sufficiently serious for us to question the integrity 
of the proceedings. 
 
Finally, D'Andrea's counsel might well have decided that 
there was little possibility that the order would be 
overturned at that juncture. It is not unusual for trial 
courts to impose costs on a party for its delay as a 
condition to permit an extension. There was no basis to 
assume that the amount of costs imposed would be 
anything but reasonable. Thus, I would not preclude review 
on the basis of D'Andrea's failure to appeal from the 
February 5, 1996 order. 
 
D'Andrea, however, was not without other opportunities 
to seek redress at the trial court level. Assuming, as I am 
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willing to do, that counsel's obligation to the client justified 
taking no action that might jeopardize the ultimate 
disposition of the case, D'Andrea offers no plausible 
explanation why it took no action once the district court 
granted summary judgment. At that time, of course, 
D'Andrea had already paid the full amount of the fees and 
costs requested by Continental's counsel because that was 
a condition precedent to the ruling. In the same order of 
December 12, 1996 containing the district court's order 
granting summary judgment to D'Andrea based on the 
waiver of subrogation clause, the court also ordered"that 
defendant comply with the February 5, 1996 order of[the 
magistrate judge] regarding the fees and expenses incurred 
by plaintiff in opposing the present summary judgment 
motion." 
 
As Judge Rosenn suggests in his opinion, the purpose 
and effect of that provision of the order is unclear. 
D'Andrea had already complied with the order to pay the 
fees and expenses. Thus, if Judge Rosenn is correct that 
the district court did not actually review the magistrate 
judge's order, then the district court never focused on the 
substance of D'Andrea's objection to the amount of fees and 
costs which it had been required to pay. 
 
Those objections are not without some facial plausibility. 
While I personally am not persuaded by D'Andrea's 
argument that the delay in interposing the dispositive 
affirmative defense was not serious or prejudicial to 
Continental, I believe there may be more basis to its 
contention that the magistrate judge failed to assess the 
relative responsibility for the delayed production of the 
contract form. 
 
The magistrate judge does not appear to have considered 
the role of Continental in filing a subrogation claim where 
the contract of the subrogor precluded such an action. To 
the contrary, his approach absolved Continental of any 
blame in filing and maintaining an action that lacked merit. 
But Continental was the party that had the obligation 
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
investigate in good faith whether the claim could be 
pursued under the law and the facts. Presumably, someone 
in its organization was aware of the incorporation of the 
 
                                23 
  
A201 document in a contract negotiated by its insured, and 
its failure to produce the entire document when requested 
to do so in discovery led to the succeeding events. 
 
Moreover, there is no suggestion that the magistrate 
judge focused on D'Andrea's contention that Continental 
pursued unreasonable discovery, such as that ultimately 
precluded by the parol evidence rule, confident that 
someone else would be paying the bill. Of course, discovery 
is not limited to admissible evidence but the magistrate 
judge had emphasized that costs it had authorized had to 
be in connection with "reasonable" discovery, and there is 
no indication on the record that Continental's counsel's bill 
for fees and expenses was scrutinized by a judge for its 
reasonableness after D'Andrea interposed its objection. In 
fact, the magistrate judge summarily denied D'Andrea's 
objections even after Continental agreed to modify its fee 
request. See App. at 402, 415. 
 
Despite what appear to me to be serious deficiencies in 
the procedure relating to the assessment of the fees and 
expenses, I do not vote to reverse and remand because I see 
no indication in the record that D'Andrea's counsel made 
an effort post-judgment to bring these matters to the 
district court's attention. The docket does not show that 
counsel made a motion under FRCP 59(e) to alter or amend 
the judgment, which would have afforded the district court 
the chance to hear from both parties. There is nothing at all 
to suggest that any statement or action by the district court 
created whatever in terrorem effect may have been caused 
by the magistrate judge's attitude. Issues relating to costs 
and expenses are by their very nature appropriate for 
consideration in the first instance at the district court level. 
Having neglected the opportunity to do this earlier, 
D'Andrea is not entitled to have them considered by this 
court. In so holding, however, I note that D'Andrea may not 
be precluded from seeking relief by filing a Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion in the district court, although I take no position on 
its use in these circumstances. 
 
Accordingly, I join Judge Rosenn in affirming the 
judgment of the district court. 
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